Publisher

GOVERNMENTJOURNALGOVERNMENTJOURNAL

Journal Jurnal Ilmu Pemerintahan : Kajian Ilmu Pemerintahan dan Politik DaerahJurnal Ilmu Pemerintahan : Kajian Ilmu Pemerintahan dan Politik Daerah Abstract

Middleman in election, some scholars called them as vote broker, is an actor who mobilize voter. Their works would have a clear and measurable commodity. Candidates will not hire middlemen when commodity can not be measured. Similarly, a middleman will not get job if there is no clear commodity that can be offered to candidate. That logic have began this study. Facts, on field indicated the debate about whether commodities (voters) actually were measured. Some middlemen registered voters, and others did not, destabilizing the logic. Is this activity measured and unmeasured? Do both have different measurement logic? In what did the differences work?. To answer these questions, I made observations and interviews in Pati at 2011-2024, where the middleman called as Sabet, and in Demak at 2015-2024, where the middleman called as Gapit. Findings, this activity always measurable on two methods. It was based on list of voters name, and other was based on influence that a middleman will have over voters in his respective social network. First method led to distributing money or valuable goods to voters on the list. Second method led to using social pressure to influence voters. Different type of voters made candidates assign such divergent strategies.

Conclusion

This manuscript has examined differences in brokerage activity and explored the underlying reasons for this difference.What might first appear to be a trivial difference – whether a broker makes a list of voters or does not – in reality signals important distinctions about the roles of various brokers in a campaign as well as differences in the types of voters targeted by brokers.The basis for this understanding begins with the recognition that voters are viewed as a commodity that candidates wish to acquire.Ultimately, a candidate wants to gain votes in order to win the election, and will hire intermediaries known as brokers to acquire the votes he desires.Yet citizens differ in the factors that motivate their voting behavior, with some voters influenced by money and others influenced by social pressure created when a trusted community leader speaks favorably about a candidate.The existence of these differences help explain the often vast differences in how brokers try to persuade voters to support their candidates.Transactional voters view elections as a “trade where they provide their votes in exchange for cash or other valuable goods.Brokers are required to create lists of names of voters committed to their candidate so that candidates can calculate how much money is required to “purchase the “commodity and also to estimate their likely support on Election Day.By contrast, non-transactional voters tend to base their choice on other considerations such as cues from community leaders based on factors such as the candidates personal morality (according to the broker), religion, and so forth.These leaders serve as cues for citizens, many of who do not even know the candidates or their policies.The reason for employing these different strategies simultaneously is because of the uncertainty about which voters are influenced most by which factors and also because the candidates and the brokers believe that some voters require both kinds of persuasion efforts before a voter will make a firm commitment to the candidate on Election Day.

Future Research

Berdasarkan penelitian ini, terdapat beberapa arah penelitian lanjutan yang menarik untuk dieksplorasi lebih lanjut. Pertama, penelitian dapat difokuskan pada bagaimana media sosial dan platform digital memengaruhi peran dan strategi broker dalam memobilisasi pemilih, terutama di kalangan generasi muda. Hal ini penting karena penggunaan media sosial semakin meningkat dalam kampanye politik dan dapat mengubah cara broker berinteraksi dengan pemilih. Kedua, penelitian dapat mengkaji lebih dalam tentang dampak dari regulasi dan pengawasan terhadap praktik-praktik klientelisme dan pembelian suara. Dengan memahami efektivitas berbagai kebijakan, pemerintah dapat merancang strategi yang lebih efektif untuk mencegah praktik-praktik yang merusak integritas pemilu. Ketiga, penelitian dapat mengeksplorasi bagaimana karakteristik sosial-ekonomi dan budaya lokal memengaruhi strategi broker dalam memengaruhi pemilih. Pemahaman ini dapat membantu dalam merancang intervensi yang lebih tepat sasaran untuk meningkatkan partisipasi politik yang inklusif dan representatif.

References

1. How Do Informal Actors Work? Between Voter Lists and Social Pressure in Elections | Jurnal Ilmu Pemerintahan... doi.org/10.24905/jip.9.2.2024.128-138How Do Informal Actors Work Between Voter Lists and Social Pressure in Elections Jurnal Ilmu Pemerintahan doi 10 24905 jip 9 2 2024 128 138
2. DOI Name 10.2490 Values. doi name values index type timestamp data hs serv 32z crossref desc 28z japanese... doi.org/10.2490DOI Name 10 2490 Values doi name values index type timestamp data hs serv 32z crossref desc 28z japanese doi 10 2490

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